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Abstract
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in many economics elds. In this
paper, we construct a simple labor model to show that a social choice function which
can be implemented costly in Bayesian Nash equilibrium may not be truthfully
implementable. The key point is the strategy cost condition given in Section 4: each
agent pays cost when performing strategy in the indirect mechanism, but will not
pay the strategy cost in the direct mechanism. As a result, the revelation principle
may not hold when agents' strategies are costly in the indirect mechanism.
JEL codes: D70
Key words: Revelation principle; Game theory; Mechanism design; Auction
theory.
1 Introduction
The revelation principle plays an important role in microeconomics theory and
has been applied to many other elds such as auction theory, game theory etc.
According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green (Page 884, Line 24 [1]): \The implication of the revelation principle is ...
to identify the set of implementable social choice functions in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, we need only identify those that are truthfully implementable."
Related denitions about the revelation principle can be seen in Appendix,
which are cited from Section 23.B and 23.D of MWG's textbook[1].
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In the traditional literatures of mechanism design, costs are usually ignored
during the process of a mechanism. Until recently, some researchers began to
investigate costs occurred in a mechanism. For every type  and every type
^ an agent might misreport, Kephart and Conitzer [2] dene a cost func-
tion as c(; ^) for doing so. Traditional mechanism design is just the case
where c(; ^) = 0 everywhere, and partial verication is a special case where
c(; ^) 2 f0;1g [3{5]. Kephart and Conitzer [2] proposed that when reporting
truthfully is costless and misreporting can be costly, the revelation principle
can fail to hold.
Despite these accomplishments, up to now, people seldom consider two dif-
ferent kinds of costs simultaneously: 1) strategy cost, which is occurred when
agents play strategies in an indirect mechanism; and 2) misreporting cost,
which is occurred when agents report types falsefully in a direct mechanism.
It is usually assumed that an agent can report truthfully with zero cost. The
aim of this paper is to investigate the justication of revelation principle when
the two kinds of costs are considered simultaneously. By constructing a simple
labor model, we show that the revelation principle may not hold when agents'
strategies are costly in the indirect mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct a social choice
function f and an indirect mechanism, where agents' strategies are costly.
In Section 3, we prove f can be implemented by the indirect mechanism in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we propose a strategy cost condi-
tion by analyzing the basic idea behind the revelation principle. In Section
5, we prove that f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equi-
librium, which contradicts the revelation principle. Finally, Section 6 draws
conclusions.
2 A labor model
Here we consider a simple labor model which uses some ideas from the rst-
price sealed auction model in Example 23.B.5 [1] and the signaling model in
Section 13.C [1]. There are one rm and two workers. The rm wants to hire
a worker, and two workers compete for this job oer. Worker 1 and Worker
2 dier in the number of units of output they produce if hired by the rm,
which is denoted by productivity type.
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
1) The possible productivity types of two workers are: L and H , where H >
L > 0. Each worker i's productivity i (i = 1; 2) is a random variable chosen
independently, and is private information for each worker.
2) Before confronting the rm, each worker gets some education. The possible
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levels of education are: eL and eH , where eL = 0, eH > 0. Each worker's
education is observable to the rm. Education does nothing for a worker's
productivity.
3) The strategy cost of obtaining education level e for a worker of some type
 is given by a function c(e; ) = e=. That is, the strategy cost of education
is lower for a high-productivity worker.
4) The misreporting cost for a low-productivity worker to report the high
productivity type H is a xed value c
0 > 0. In addition, a high-productivity
worker is assumed to report the low productivity type L with zero cost.
The labor model's outcome is represented by a vector (y1; y2), where yi denotes
the probability that worker i gets the job oer with wage w > 0. Recall
that the rm does not know the exact productivity types of two workers, but
its aim is to hire a worker with productivity as high as possible. This aim
can be represented by a social choice function f(~) = (y1(~); y2(~)), in which
~ = (1; 2),
y1(~) =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 > 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 < 2
; y2(~) =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 < 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 > 2
(1)
In order to implement the above f(~), the rm designs an indirect mechanism
  = (S1; S2; g) as follows:
1) A random move of nature determines the productivity types of two workers:
1; 2 2 fL; Hg.
2) Conditional on his type i, each worker i = 1; 2 chooses his education level
as a bid bi : fL; Hg ! f0; eHg. The strategy set Si is the set of all possible
bids bi(i), and the outcome function g is dened as:
g(b1; b2) = (p1; p2) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if b1 > b2
(0:5; 0:5); if b1 = b2
(0; 1); if b1 < b2
(2)
where pi (i = 1; 2) is the probability that worker i gets the oer.
Let u0 be the utility of the rm, and u1; u2 be the utilities of worker 1; 2 in
the indirect mechanism   respectively, then u0(b1; b2) = p11 + p22   w, and
for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
ui(bi; bj; i) =
8>><>>:
w   bi=i; if bi > bj
0:5w   bi=i; if bi = bj
 bi=i; if bi < bj
(3)
The item \ bi=i" occurred in Eq (3) is just the strategy cost paid by agent
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i of type i when he performs the strategy bi(i) in the indirect mechanism.
The individual rationality (IR) constraints are: ui(bi; bj; i)  0, i = 1; 2.
3 f is Bayesian implementable
Proposition 1: If w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), the social choice function f(~) given
in Eq (1) can be implemented by the indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a separating strategy, i:e:, workers with dierent productivity
types choose dierent education levels,
b1(1) =
8<:eH ; if 1 = H0; if 1 = L ; b2(2) =
8<:eH ; if 2 = H0; if 2 = L : (4)
Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Assume bj(j) takes this form, i:e:,
bj(j) =
8<:eH ; if j = H0; if j = L ; (5)
then consider worker i's problem (i 6= j). For each i 2 fL; Hg, worker
i solves a maximization problem maxbi h(bi; i), where by Eq (3) the object
function is
h(bi; i) = (w bi=i)P (bi > bj(j))+(0:5w bi=i)P (bi = bj(j)) (bi=i)P (bi < bj(j))
(6)
We discuss this maximization problem in four dierent cases:
1) Suppose i = j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = 0)  (bi=L)P (bi < 0)
=
8<:w   eH=L; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
2) Suppose i = L, j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = eH)  (bi=L)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=L; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0
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Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
3) Suppose i = H , j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = 0)  (bi=H)P (bi < 0)
=
8<:w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
4) Suppose i = j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = eH)  (bi=H)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
From the above four cases, it can be seen that if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L),
the strategy bi (i) of worker i
bi (i) =
8<:eH ; if i = H0; if i = L (7)
is the optimal response to the strategy bj(j) of worker j (j 6= i) given in Eq (5).
Therefore, the strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by  .
Now let us investigate whether the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) satises the
individual rationality (IR) constraints. Following Eq (3) and Eq (7), the (IR)
constraints are changed into: 0:5w bH=H > 0. Obviously, w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L)
satises the (IR) constraints.
In summary, if w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), then by Eq(2) and Eq(7), for any
~ = (1; 2), where 1; 2 2 fL; Hg, there holds:
g(b1(1); b

2(2)) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
; (8)
which is just the social choice function f(~) given in Eq (1). 2
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4 Strategy cost condition
Before we discuss the truthful implementation problem, let us rst cite the
basic idea behind the revelation principle given in MWG's textbook (Page 884,
Line 16, [1]): \If in mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), each agent nds that,
when his type is i, choosing s

i (i) is his best response to the other agents'
strategies, then if we introduce mediator who says `Tell me your type, i, and
I will play si (i) for you', each agent will nd truth telling to be an optimal
strategy given that all other agents tell the truth. That is, truth telling will
be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this direct revelation game".
Although this basic idea looks reasonable, it should be emphasized that there
indeed exists a condition behind the mediator's announcement \Tell me your
type, i, I will play s

i (i) for you." The underlying condition is denoted as the
following strategy cost condition:
Strategy cost condition: After receiving each agent i's type i, in order to play
si (i) for agent i, the mediator must also pay the strategy cost which would
be paid by agent i himself when carrying out si (i) in the original mechanism.
Obviously, only when the strategy cost condition holds will the mediator's
announcement \I will play si (i) for you" be credible to the agents. Otherwise
none of agents will believe the mediator's announcement and hence no agent
will attend the direct mechanism, which means the direct mechanism cannot
start up.
There is another viewpoint to consider the justication of strategy cost condi-
tion. Let us take a look at the proof of revelation principle given in Appendix
Proposition 23.D.1. In Eq (23.D.3), the original mechanism   works: each a-
gent i pays the strategy cost by himself when carrying out si (i) (i = 1;    ; I),
and the designer carries out the outcome function g. As a comparison, in Eq
(23.D.4), the direct mechanism works: at this time the strategy set of agent i is
just his type set, Si = i, and the designer carries out the outcome function f .
Hence, all things that each agent i has to do in the direct mechanism are only
to announce a type i, which requires no strategy cost at all. Put dierently,
by Denition 23.B.5 of the direct mechanism, each agent i only announces
a type i and does not carrying out s

i (i), hence does not need to pay any
strategy cost by himself. It should be noted that if some agent misreports his
type in the direct mechanism, then he will pay the misreporting cost as we
have assumed before.
Some possible questions to the strategy cost condition are as follows:
Q1: In the above explanation of direct mechanism, the mediator is actually a
virtual role and does not exist at all.
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A1: The notion \mediator" occurred in the strategy cost condition can be
replaced by the notion \designer", and the following discussions are the same.
Q2: In the direct mechanism, after each agent i announces his type i, he will
still pay the strategy cost by himself.
A2: This viewpoint is in contrast to Denition 23.B.5 of the direct mechanism
(See Appendix). It should be emphasized that by Denition 23.B.5, the action
si (i) is illegal for agent i. Thus, it is wrong to claim that agent i will still pay
the strategy cost related to the illegal action si (i) in the direct mechanism.
Q3: The designer may dene the direct mechanism more generally. In partic-
ular, The designer denes a new mechanism in which each agent reports his
type, then the mechanism suggest to them which action to take, and the nal
outcome of the mechanism depends on both the report and the action (i.e.,
education level in this paper).
A3: As Myerson pointed out in Ref [6], the concepts of direct mechanism and
revelation principle are in the eld of static or one-stage games. However, the
new mechanism is in the eld of dynamic or multistage games and hence is
irrelevant to our discussion.
Q4: Let us consider the equilibrium in the indirect mechanism. Given the e-
quilibrium, there is a mapping from vectors of agents' types into outcomes.
Now let us take that mapping to be a revelation game. It will be the case that
no type of any agent can make an announcement that diers from his true
type and do better.
A4: This viewpoint ignores the strategy costs occurred in the mechanism.
Similar to the above analysis of the proof of Proposition 23.D.1, the strate-
gy costs occurred in the equilibrium in the indirect mechanism are paid by
agents themselves. But, consider the mapping from vectors of agents' types
into outcomes, at this time each agent will not pay the strategy cost any more
by Denition 23.B.5. As a result, the utility function of each agent may be
changed (See Eq (9) in Section 5), and some agent may nd it benecial for
him to dier from his true type.
To sum up, the strategy cost condition is the cornerstone for the direct rev-
elation mechanism to start up. However, in Section 5, we will show that it is
the strategy cost condition itself that makes a Bayesian implementable social
choice function may not be truthfully implementable, which eventually contra-
dicts the revelation principle.
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5 f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Proposition 2: If the misreporting cost c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the social choice func-
tion f(~) given in Eq (1) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the direct revelation mechanism  direct = (1;2; f(~)), in
which 1 = 2 = fL; Hg, ~ 2 1  2. The timing steps of  direct are as
follows:
1) A random move of nature determines the productivity types of workers:
i 2 i (i = 1; 2), and each worker i reports a type ^i 2 i to a mediator.
Here ^i may not be his true type i.
2) The mediator plays the strategy bi (^i) (i = 1; 2) for each agent i, and
submits the bids to the rm:
bi (^i) =
8<:eH ; if ^i = H0; if ^i = L
3) The rm performs the outcome function g(b1; b2), and hires the winner.
According to the strategy cost condition, each worker i does not need to pay
the strategy cost bi=i by himself anymore in the direct mechanism. As as-
sumed before, the only cost needed to pay in the direct mechanism is the
misreporting cost c0 for a low-productivity worker to report the high produc-
tivity type H . For worker i (i = 1; 2), if his type is i = L, his utility function
will be as follows:
ui(^i; ^j; i = L) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
w   c0; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w   c0; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (9)
If worker i's type is i = H , his utility function will be as follows:
ui(^i; ^j; i = H) =
8>><>>:
w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H); or(L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (10)
It can be seen that the strategy cost \ bi=i" occurred in Eq (3) disappears in
Eq (9) and Eq (10). Now, following Eq (9) and Eq (10), we discuss the utility
matrix of worker i and j in four cases.
1) The true types of worker i and j are i = H , j = H .
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HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L [0:5w; 0:5w] [0; w]
H [w; 0] [0:5w; 0:5w]
Obviously, the dominant strategy for worker i and j is to truthfully report,
i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H . Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
2) The true types of worker i and j are i = L, j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L [0:5w; 0:5w] [0; w]
H [w   c0; 0] [0:5w   c0; 0:5w]
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for worker j is still to truthfully
report ^j = H ; and if the misreporting cost c
0 < 0:5w, the dominant strategy
for worker i is to misreport ^i = H , otherwise agent i should truthfully report.
Thus, under the condition c0 < 0:5w, the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) =
(H ; H).
3) The true types of worker i and j are i = H , j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L [0:5w; 0:5w] [0; w   c0]
H [w; 0] [0:5w; 0:5w   c0]
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for worker i is still to truthfully
report ^i = H ; and if the misreporting cost c
0 < 0:5w, the dominant strategy
for worker j is to misreport ^j = H , otherwise agent j should truthfully
report. Thus, under the condition c0 < 0:5w, the unique Nash equilibrium is
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
4) The true types of worker i and j are i = L, j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L [0:5w; 0:5w] [0; w   c0]
H [w   c0; 0] [0:5w   c0; 0:5w   c0]
It can be seen that: if the misreporting cost c0 < 0:5w, the dominant strategy
for both worker i and worker j is to misreport, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H , otherwise
both agents should truthfully report. Thus, under the condition c0 < 0:5w, the
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unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
To sum up, under the condition 0 < c0 < 0:5w, the unique Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by the direct mechanism is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and the
unique outcome of  direct is that each worker has the same probability 0.5 to
get the job oer.
Consequently, the social choice function f(~) is not truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss the justication of revelation principle through a
simple labor model in which agents pay strategy costs during the process of
an indirect mechanism. The main characteristics of the labor model are as
follows: 1) In the indirect mechanism, carrying out strategy is costly, i.e.,
worker of type H pays the strategy cost eH=H when obtaining education
level eH ; 2) The productivity type of worker is private information and not
observable to the rm; 3) Misreporting a higher type is also costly, i.e., a low-
productivity worker can pretend to be a high-productivity worker with the
misreporting cost c0.
The major dierence between this paper and traditional literatures is focused
on the strategy cost condition given in Section 4. It can be seen that:
1) In the indirect mechanism  , the utility function of each worker i = 1; 2 is
given by Eq (3), in which the strategy cost bi=i is the key item that makes
the separating strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L). Thus, the social choice function f can be
implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2) Following the strategy cost condition, in the direct mechanism, the utility
function of each worker i is changed from Eq (3) to Eq (9) and Eq (10). Under
the condition c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium of the game induced
by the direct mechanism is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H). Thus, the social choice function
f is not truthfully implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In summary, the revelation principle may not hold when agents' strategies are
costly in the indirect mechanism.
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Appendix: Denitions in Section 23.B and 23.D [1]
Consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1;    ; I. Each agent i pri-
vately observes his type i that determines his preferences. The set of possible
types of agent i is denoted as i. The agent i's utility function over the out-
comes in set X given his type i is ui(x; i), where x 2 X.
Denition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : 1  I !
X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types (1;    ; I), assigns a
collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1;    ; SI and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X.
Denition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which
Si = i for all i and g() = f() for all  2 1     I .
Denition 23.D.1: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]
for all s^i 2 Si.
Denition 23.D.2: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Denition 23.D.3: The social choice function f() is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if si (i) = i (for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I) is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism   = (1;    ;I ; f()).
That is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)
for all ^i 2 i.
Proposition 23.D.1: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that im-
plements the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements f() in Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um, then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
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g(s()) = f() for all , and for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji](23:D:2)
for all s^i 2 Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(si (^i); s i( i)); i)ji](23:D:3)
for all ^i 2 i. Since g(s()) = f() for all , (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji](23:D:4)
for all ^i 2 i. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1), the condition for f()
to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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